Technological society and institutionalised conflict management. by Moon, Kenneth Reginald.
I 
MOON, K.R, Te.tl'\NO\.OblCAL50Cle.T'1 ANP ... , MANAGE.HE:NT 

,, 
KENNETH REGINALD MOON 
"TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND 
INSTITUTIONALISED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT " 
Research paper in Conflict and Conflict Management , 
1977 LL.M . Special Topic 
Victoria University of Wellington , 
Wellington , New Zealand , 
1977 . 

INTRODUCTION 
The industrial revolution, and trerapid advances of pure 
and applied science since that time have in one or two centuries 
established technology as the dominant characteristic of western 
societies . Technology as a way of thinking as well as by its 
physical products permeates every institution of such societies . 
Or does it? \vha t imp act has the ascendancy of technology had on 
conflict managing institutions? Or put another way, are these ~ 
institutions in tune with technological society? 
This paper includes within its purview a comparison of 
the different types of conflict management institutions which have 
evolved in typical western societies. Of particular interest is 
the way in which the various institutions have developed since the 
industrial revolution . 
It is appropriate before proceeding further to indicate 
the scope of this study and to define some terms. "Conflict" 
has a very broad connotation. Generally speaking, the conflicts 
envisaged in this paper are those which have been considered at 
some time to be within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts -
that is Dicey's English courts. The expression "conflict 
management" is used in preference to "dispute processing
111 because 
among the institutions to be discussed are the courts of law and 
their function cannot be properly described as simply the processing 
of disputes. A "dispute" has been define d by Gulliver in the 
following 'ivay. "A dispute arises out of disagreement between 
persons (individuals or subgroups) in which the alleged rights 
of one part3/ are claimed to be infringed, interfered with, or 
denied by the other party" .
2 Now one of the concerns of the courts 
is criminal law, but is the criminal trial an outcome of a 
dispute? A simple substitution of "state" for "person" in the 
definition does not seem to gel . In the crime of assult , for 
l. As with other writers "management" and "processing" 
are preferred to "resolution" and "settlement" . 
2. Gulliver , "Case Studies of Law in Non-Western 
Societies : - Introduction", in Nader (ed), Law in Culture and 
Society (1969), 14 . 
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example, what right of the state has been interefered with. Dispute 
processing seems associated with private law. Institutionalised 
dispute processing will be observed in many primitive societies, 
but criminal law and public law in general is dependant upon a high 
degree of social solidarity
3 Hoebel notes the limited use of 
communal authority exercised on its own behalf in primitive 
societies "it takes the form of lynch law in some instances ... 
L-lynch law_7 is a first fitful step toward the emergence of 
criminal law ... 114 The relation between "law" and "dispute 
processing" is illustrated by the model in figure 1 where the courts 
when dealing with private law, act as but on.e institution in the 
totality of dispute processing institutions. 
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FIG i 
The difficulty of assimilating the functions of the 
courts into the dispute processing category is highlighted in the 
following, "In criminal law, the situation is much more 
complicated. Here, the law does not simply stand as an arbitrator 
of private quarrels but is itself one of the parties to the conflict 
Much of the complexity of criminal p rocedure arises out of this 
dilemna, namely, that the law is both a party to the conflict and 
3. 
4. 
Quaere whether this is in conflict with Durkheim. 
Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man (1954), 277 
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an agency for a settlement by award, that is, an arbitrator. In 
Anglo-American law, an attempt is made to resolve the dilemna 
by a sharp definition and differentiation fo roles: The attorneys 
for the defence and for the prosecution symbolise the conflict; the 
judge and the jury symbolise the arbitration element. The 
conflict roles are highly stylised, as, indeed, is the whole 
procedure; this serves a function in resolving the dilemna imposed 
by the mixture of roles in the law, ... 115 
The methodology of the present study involves the use 
of the courts as a reference institution, and an important yard 
used will be to assess the place given to, or capable of being 
given to, non-legal expertise in the various conflict managing 
institutions. Part I sets out a theoretical framework of conflict 
management grounded mainly on work by Aubert, 6 Eckhoff, 7 and 
Felstiner. 8 From this certain conjunctions between conflict 
management and technology are deduced. Part II, while having an 
empirical flavour is not an attempt to present a series of case 
studies in order to test the deductions made from the theory, but 
is rather a compendium of contemporary incidents and insights 
relevant to the conjunctions referred to. 
PART I 
THEORIES OF SOCIETY, THEORIES OF CONFLICT 
There are two main theori e s or models of society: the 
structural-functional model, and the power-conflict model. The 
structural-functional model explains why society is relatively 
cohesive, o.rdere:1 and stab le, while on the other hand, the power-
5. 
6 . 
Boulding, Conflict and Defense ( 196 3) 
Aubert: "Compe tition and Dissensus: Two types of 
Conflict and of Conflict Resolution" (1963) Jou~nal of Conflict 
Resolution 26_; "Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts: The Case of s 
Small Industrial Society'', in Nadar (ed.) Law in Culture and 
(1969), 282. 
7. Eckhoff, "The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator 
in Conflict Resolution", (1966) 10 Acta Socioloaica, 148. 
8. Felstiner, " In fluences of Social Organisation on 
Dispute processing", (1974) 9 Law and Society Review, 63. 
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conflict model explains why society is in a state of conflict 
disorder and change. The structural-functional model is frequently 
associated with Talcott Parsons while the power conflict model is 
associated with Marx. To many theorists, the two models are 
mutually exclusive and one believes in oue or the other as being 
9 the model of society. However, others see room for a duality 
of mddels, using one or the other depending upon what is to be 
explained, that is both models are considered equally valid 
prespectives of society. An alalogue from the physical sciences 
is the wave-particle duality of light. 
The essential components of the two models, as 
posited by Dahrendorf is set out below. 
Structural-functional model 
Durkheimian Model) 
(or consensual, or Parsonian -
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Every society is a relatively persisting configuration 
of elements. 
Every society is a well-intergrated configuration 
of elements 
Every element in a society contributes to its 
functioning . 
Every society rests on the consensus of its members. 
Conflict Model 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Every society is subjected at every moment to change: 
Social change is ubiquitous. 
Every society experiences at every moment social 
conflict: Social conflict is ubiquitous. 
Every element in a society contributes to its change. 
Every society rests on constraint of some of its 
members by others. 
The first point that Dahrendorf makes is that the structural-
functional model does not shed much light on the phenomenon of 
social conflict and change - institutions and individuals 
promoting conflict or change (intentionally or unintentionally) 
. 1 f . 1 10 . are seen as simp y dys unctiona or deviant. Dahrendrof asserts 
9. e . g . Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict'', 
(1958) 2, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 170 
10. Coser argues that conflict is functional to the 
existing order: The Functi ons of Social Conflict (1956) ;Continuities 
in the Study of Social Conflict (1967) see~ 1~7, para , for 
examf)le. --~------- t"-o.+rv' 
that a meaningful explanation of conflict can only be found 
in the conflict model. 
A study of conflict management in modern society 
seems prima facie rooted in a theoretical commitment to the 
structural-functional model. A Marxist would say that such a 
study was fundamentally irrelevant because the agencies of conflict 
management such as the courts, are mere super-structural 
institutions resting on the economic structure of society, that is 
say the means of production. The writer contends however, that a 
study of conflict management is meaningful even in Marxian terms. 
In most developed societies, contrary to might have been expected, 
theproletariat has not realised the true interests of thei :~ class. 
False consciousness and "irrationality" prevail. The objective 
class conflict has not become manifest. Why? Because the 
dominant class, farseeing the need to contain social conflict, 
has transformed the state so as to appear to more broadly 
represent society as a whole. Ostensible representatives of the 
proletariat were admitted to power, even at some sacrifice to the 
dominant class. This transformed state has imposed a structure 
upon society which has contained the objective class conflict. 
The institutions of the state effectively channel behaviour along 
safe paths. This has not come about by the use of naked power but 
by socialisation - bourgeois values have been internalised. 
"Technical progress, extended to a whole system of 
domination and co-ordination, creates forms of life (and of power) 
which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to 
defeat or refute all protest in the name of the histroical prospects 
of freedom from toil and domination. Contemporary society seems 
to be capable of containing social change ... this containment of 
social change is perhaps the most singular achievement of 
advanced industrial society; the general acceptance of the 
National Purpose, bi-partisan policy, the decline of pluralism, the 
collusion of Business and Labour within the strong State testify 
to the intergration of opposites which is the result as well as 
the pr -rc gu~site of this achi e vement ... 
"It is precisely this need (to express their true 
interests) which enables the established society manages to repress 
to the degree to which it is capable of "delivering the goods" on 
an increasingly large scale, and using the scientific conquest of 
nature for the scientific conquest of man ... 
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"Technology serves to institute new, more effective, 
and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion ... 
"But in the contemporary period, the technological 
controls appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the 
benefit of all social groups and interests - to such an exten~ 
that all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction 
impossible".
11 
From the perspective outlined above it can be seen 
that the "super-structural" institutions have assumed 
fundamental imoortance. 
At a quite different level, the apparent necessity 
for a legal structure in all societies including socialist 
societies cannot be ignored. Some would say that this is 
inevitable given mans basic nature, but whatever the reason this 
necessity for law in some form or another seems undeniable. Law 
in the Soviet Union is "a most important lever ... in 
establishing the material and technical base for communism
1112 
Attempts to do without law after the revolution failed.
13 
Assuming a society can transcend the socialist state, what then? 
"Violations of norms of social behaviour will be met by 'measures' 
appled by 'public opinion, the strength of the group , social 
influence' . 1114 A full circle will then have been executed -
conflict management in the form practiced by Hoebel's primitive 
man. The super-structure then appear ubiquitous - in primitive 
societies it is the structure; in industrial societies an 
economic sub-structure slips in underneath; in truely 
communist societies it appears that it will be some form of 
super-structure that will remain. 
11. 
12. 
Marcuse,One Dirrensional Man (1972, Abacus ed.), 11-22 
per Ioffe and Shargorodsky in Soviet Law and Governrrent 
Volurre II, No. 2, page 3 , quoted in Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence 
(1972, 3rd ed.), 644. 
12. 
13. 
page 7. 
Lloyd, op. cit, 636 
Lloyd, op. cit., 645, quoting from Ioffe and Shargorodsky, 
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CONFLICT TYrOLOGY 
The starting point of this discourse is Aubert's 
postulation of two distinct types of conflict: conflicts of 
interest (or competition); and conflict of values (dissensus) . 15 
A conlfict of interest is where two parties both want the same 
thing, but there is not enough of it so satisfy them both. A 
possible example of such a conflict was the Taranaki land dispute 
in the 1860's - the European settlers wanted Maori land, while 
the maoris wanted to retain it. 16 A further possible example was 
th~ 1951 Waterfront Strike where the watersiders wanted a pay 
increase of 4/lO½d per hour while the employers were prepared 
to pay only 4/ 7½d. 17 A typical interpeEsona1
18 
conflict of interest 
is that which arises in commerce where a buyer would like to 
purchase a commodity at a price $X, whereas the seller would like 
a higher price $Y. 
A conflict of values, perhaps better described as a 
dissensus, is wh8re two parties disagree over the normative status 
of a social object and/or factual matters. Note that a conflict 
of interest necessarily imp lies a consensus over the value of the 
object in dispute. An example of a dissensus is where two 
players in a game disagree over what rule should apply to a 
particular incident in the game. 
15. Aubert (note 6) . 
16, 17. These conflicts reveal the intertwining of interest 
and values which occurs in real conflicts. At one moment they 
to involve value s - both were prosecuted with appeals to values 
and ideology, and both were "resolved" by one party suffering 
a complete defeat. However, it is submitted that the source of 
these disputes was a conflict of interest which was subsequently 
transformed to a conflict of values j_n order to facilitate a means 
of prosecuting the conflict which appeared to one or both 
disputants as being favourable to themselves. Transformation 
of an interest conflict to one of values paves the way for total 
commitment in a struggle which can then only end in defeat for 
oneside. 
dcfcut may 
18. 
(Note that in certain circumstances an honourable 
~ ~ . be to morally pre ferabl e to a bought compromise). 
Aubert qualifies his typology as one of interpersonal 
conflicts at times. 
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The conflict typology described need not correspond 
to actual instances of conflict, but serves as a tool in the 
analysis of actual conflicts which frequently will include a 
mixture of the two conflict types in pure form. 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY 
At one level , the utility of the distinction between 
a conflict of interest and a dissensus lies in the potential to 
predict the most effective means of managing a conflict . To the 
typology of conflict there exists a corresponding typology of 
modes of conflict manage~ent . Simply put, negotiation is the 
appropriate device for managing conflicts of interest , while 
adjudication is the appropriate device for managing a dissensus. 
"As long as a conflict of interest remains relatively pure , it is 
amenable to solutions through bargaining and compromise, on the 
condition that there is something to give and something to take on 
both sides'·. 19 There is _an exception: incompatibility of 
interests may be total, such as the case where a contract is 
signed and the goods subsequently perish. Here adjudication is 
called for as the relationship has become a zero-sum game. 
Settlement of a disagreement over values or the truth of facts 
usually requires the intervention of a third party who 
ascertains the true facts , s~lects the relevant norm and decides 
which party is to prevail. A characteristic of adjudication is 
that one party wins and the other party loses. The parties have no 
private rights in norms or truth which they can trade off . 
At another level the utility of this typology of conflict 
and conflict management lies in its implications for the 
manipulation of conflict. A conflict where the parties are 
emphasising values may be resolved by negotiation and 
compromise if the value aspect i~ de-empl1asised and the interests 
of the parties stressed. On the other hand a conflict of 
interest must be transformed to a dissensus if it is to be 
resolved by adjudication . Aubert observes that such a 
transformation is a necessary preliminary to conflict resolution 
19 . Aubert (1963) (Note £), 30 
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in a court of law. The typology thus does not necessarily imply 
a rigid casual link between the conflict source type and the means 
of resolving it. For example, "a dissensus may arise out of 
opposing interests, either as a consequence of the conflict and 
hostility or as a consequence of the structure of the conflict-
solving mechanism. 1120Again, "certain sources of conflict may tend to 
call forth a certain type of mechanism for conflict resolution, but 
the form of the conflict may also frequently be determined by the 
available means of solution. 21 
Mention must be made of some views critical of Aubert's 
typology. One criticism is that in reality ~11 conflicts may 
ultimately be seen as conflicts of interest. Value aspects are 
apparent rather than real - a conflict is painted in value terms 
as part of a stratagem. No doubt this is often the case (see 
notes 2 and 3), but it seems quite credible that a religious 
conflict for example, could subsist free of interest aspects. If 
instead of the somewhat loose term "conflict of values", the terms 
"factual dissensus" or "normative dissensus" are used, the 
possibilities of there being conflicts which are other than 
conflicts of interest are more readily envisaged provided that 
interest is not given the meaningless interpretation of 'the 
will to win". It is interesting to note Boulding too derives an 
interest - value type distinction, although in a somewhat 
different way to Aubert. He divides the value structure of a 
persons image into two parts: "an inner core around which 
he intergrates his personality and which holds him together and an 
outer shell which he holds or possesses but which does not 
constitute an essential part of the image of the person who 
does the holding or possessing: 1121arf the conflict is about 
a core value "reconciliation" will be difficult or impossible, (the 
core is subject to catastrophic conversion but not small changes), 
whereas the shell is amenable to modification by discussion and 
20. 
21. 
21a. 
Idem, 31 
Idem, 26 
Boulding, op. ci t. (Note 5) , 312. 
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argument. The boundary between core and shell may vary, even 
during the one conflict, and certainly differs between personalities. 
Kidder
2
lbconsiders it a mistake to treat adjudication 
as a phenomen0n which normally functions in a different way 
from negotiation - the influence of rules in adjudication as 
opposed to bargaining strategy is overated. Suffice to say at 
this point that there are a large number of cases where legal 
rules are omnipotent. Later some examples are given where legal 
rules have been decisive to the point of absurdity. Gulliver 21 c 
criticises the interest - negotiation, values - adjudication 
correspondence. He points out that in many conflicts of values 
there is no applicable norm. This , itis submitted, takes an 
unnecessaril y narrow view of a norm - there is always a higher 
norm (legal principle, public policy) which can, and is, drawn 
upon in the absence of a specific legal rule. Skill in moving 
within the hierarchy of norms would seem the very essence of an 
adjudicator. This flexibility does not imply a compromise in 
place of a decision. 
Gulliver stresses the point that norms play a part 
in negotiation as well as in adjudication, especially in the 
definitional phases of negotiation. However this does not seem 
to effect the validity of the conflict/conflict management 
typology since a normative consensus is to be expected in conflicts 
o f interest - and this consensus in many cases may come about 
in the bargaining preliminaries by reference to market prices 
21d 
and precedents set in prior exchanges. An unfortunate example 
Gulliver chooses to illustrate his point must be mentioned at 
this point since the present writer will later elaborate in some 
detail on the mechanisms involved. Gulliver notes that a judge . 
21b. Kidder, "Formal Litigation and Professional Insecurity: 
Leq;:il Entrepen e urship in South India. "(1974) 9, Law & Society Review 11 at 3C 
2 lc · Gulliver," Negotiation as Dispute Settlement", ( 19 7 3) 7 Law & 
Society Review, 667 
21d. Aubert (1963),30. 
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is frequently faced with conflicts of interest upon which he 
must and does, adjudicate. 21eThis is of course undeniable, but 
the explanation of such a phonomenon is perhaps the most valuable 
insight provided by Aubert's theory - that it is a pre-requisite 
to the functioning of a court that a conflict involving interest 
aspects be transformed to a dissensus of facts and norm~ however 
artificial this transformation might be when the conflict is purely 
one of interest. The legitimacy of transformation is probably 
more evident if the correspondence is stated as being between 
conflicts as they are expressed and the respective management 
mode. 
FURTHER MODES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
The devices of negotiation and adjudication do not 
exhaust the modes of conflict management. At one extreme 
conflict may simply be avoided and as Felstiner 22 has pointed 
out, in a technologically complex rich society this mode of 
conflict management is probably the most common. A typical 
example of avoidance is where a person who has had something 
unsatisfactorily repaired goes to another repair firm in 
preference to pursuing the matter with the first repair firm. 
The conflict in this case is a conflict of interest, but 
avoidance is also applicable to value conflicts. In fact two 
parties having completely incompatible values may never engage 23 , 2 L 
in conflict since their lack of common ground may keep them apart. 
At the other extreme a conflict may be terminated 
by self-help or conquest. Boulding suggests that self-help is 
not common because the work and costs incurred by the active 
party are greater than would be the case if some other device of 
conflict management was used. 25 While this may be true where 
the conflict is between large groups or nations, in interpersonal 
conflict the degree to which self-help is resorted to would appear 
to be a function of the degree to which societal values have been 
internalised. 
2le. 
22. 
23. 
2 4 . 
25. 
Idem,682 
Felstiner (Note 8) 
Aubert (1969) (Note 6), 285 
Boulding (Notes) ,308 
Idem, 309 
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A further mode of con f l ict man agement is mediatio n , 
which may be considered as negotiation assisted by the presence 
\l • • 
of a third party. Mediation consists of influencing the parties 
b 1 . h . . 11 
26 
to come to an agreement y appea ing tot eir own interests . 
Mediation is viewed by some as simply a sub- category of 
negotiation, another sub- category being conciliation.
27 Yet 
a further mode of conflict management is arbitration wh ich 
because it may be analysed as agreed private adjudication can be 
·d d · 1 b f d' d' · 
28 
consi ere as simp y a su -category o a JU ication . 
If one ignores the categories of avoidance a nd 
self-help , it can be seen that the additional categories 
mentioned above are but sub- categories of Aubert's types . 
Mediation and conciliation are essentially negotiation with a 
third party superimposed , while arbitration is simply 
adjudication resting on a prior agreement to submit to 
adjudication . 
FROM DYAD TO TRIAD 
Institutionalised conflict management is characterised 
by the addition of a third party to the parties in dispute . The 
third party takes part in the dispute but is "someone who is 
neither asserting or resisting the assertion of a claim in his 
29 
own behalf nor is acting as the agent of such party" . The 
presence of the third party is not necessarily ind i cative of a 
dissensus as Aubert ' s analysis might suggest - the association 
of a mediator with the process of negotiation has already been 
noted - but is determined by a number of factors .
30 
2 6. Eckhoff (Note 7 ), 158 
27, 28. These classifications are discussed under "Third Party 
Typology" (post) 
29. Felstiner (Note 8), 69 
30 . The transition from dyad to triad is however undeniably 
a hallmark of law . "Law is distinguished from mere custom in that 
it endows certain selected individuals with the privilege -right 
of applying the sanction of physical coercion if need be . .. In 
primitive law (sic) the tendency is to allocate authority to the 
party who is directly injured ." (Hoebel , The Law of Primitive 
Man (1954) , 277 . ) 
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These factors are distinct from those which determine the 
potentiality of the third party to successfully manage the 
conflict, this being dependent both upon the characteristics 
of the conflict and treprocedure adopted by the third party. 
The transition from dyad to triad is important for the purposes 
of the present study since it is an essential ingredient of 
institutionalised conflict management, and it may be expected 
that any impact made by the coming of the technological society 
will be manifested in a triadic process. 
A summary of some of the factors which can create a 
need for the introduction of a third party into a dispute js 
given in figure 2. 
THIRD PARTY TYPOLOGY 
In this section the characteristics of the judge, the 
mediator, the arbitrator and the conciliator will be discussed 
It is the function of the judge to make a decision 
about which of the parties to a conflict is right. This means 
that the judge must look at the history of the behaviour of the 
parties and determine guilt or fault by reference to a series of 
rules , or customs, or supposedly universal notions of what is 
right and just. That is, the judge must (i) ascertain the facts 
(ii) determine the appropriate norms and (iii) apply the norms 
to the facts at hand and deliver a judgement in favour of one of 
the parties. 31 In theory at least, the judge will not be 
concerned with the interests of the parties and their respective 
positions in the future. 
Adherence to a judgement, bearing in mind that one 
party must lose, will be dependent on two main factors (i) 
respect for the framework of norms utilised by the judge and (ii) 
the authority of the judge. "There may be many reasons for the 
parties' respect for those norms on which the judge bases his 
31. In certain types of cases in common law jurisdictions 
~ a jury will complete· step (i), i.e. decide the facts, but see 
) pp 24 and 25, post . 
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decisions; for instance, they may be internalised, or one fears 
gods' or people's punishments if one violates them, or one finds 
it profitable in the long run to follow them 11 • 32 It is of course 
a pre-requisite that the judge possesses a good understanding 
of the norms and has the skill to determine the facts of a 
dispute. Familiarity with norms and their application may require 
a special expertise which is possessed only by the chosen few. 
In modern western societies this expertise may be assessed in terms 
of experience and professional qualifications, but in other 
societies contact with supernatural powers may be considered 
more relevant. 
Likewise, expertise in determining facts presupposes 
an ability to understand and clarify factual relations, and the 
level of expertise required will vary according to the nature 
of the subject matter comprising the facts. In a technological 
society, it is inevitable that some cases to be adjudicated will 
involve factual relations demanding considerable scientific 
expertise to unravel. In the context of the courts where the 
traditional qualifications of a judge are experience and traini nq 
in law, the pre-requisite skill may in such cases be absent. As 
technology percolates through society, the legal norms themselves 
in many spheres become laden with the trappings of science, 
and make yet further demands on the non-legal expertise of the 
judge. A judge is a specialist thrown up by general social role -
differentiation and since the technological society mult~plies 
role -differentiation judicial specialisation would seem a 
necessary consequence. 
The above discussion has dealt with the significance 
of respect.for norms and judges as a factor in the effectiveness 
of a 1udgement. If this respect does not exist efficacy of the 
judgement is obtained by forcing the parties to comply with it. 
" ... there is also a set of secondary norms of adjudication which 
single out the judge as the proper person to settle the dispute 
and which ... also impose upon the parties the duty to abide by 
his decision. 1133 Accordingly, there will usually be a power 
32. 
33. 
Eckhoff (Note 7), 162 
Eckhoff (Note 7), 163 
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behind the judge which can be called upon to coerce a 
recalcitrant party into compliance. Felstiner takes this further 
and asserts that compliance with adjudicative decisions is more 
a result of the coercive power which they command than by their 
merits. To tell the losing party in adjudication that what 
he considers as history is either an illusion or a lie, 
and/or that the behaviour he considered acceptable is anti-social 
will frequently alienate that party from tJ-e legal process. The 
loser has two options: to see the error of his ways, or to see 
the adjudicative process as irrelevant. The latter will 
frequently require less psychological effort than the former. 
"Unconvinced of their original error, losers respond to an 
adverse decision only because the consequences of not responding 
34 would be worse." In the context of the inve stigation which is 
the subject of this paper it may be simply noted at this point 
that where the conflict involves a crime a technological society 
can hardly be expected to be satisfied with an "unscientific" 
penalty when the possibilities of a scientific re-education seem 
credible. 
The Mediator 
An essential distinction between the function of a 
mediator and the function of the judge is that while in adjudication 
it is the latter who makes the decisions, in mediation it is the 
parties who make the decisions and not the mediator. A corollary 
of this is that mediated settlements need not be backed by 
coercive power. This follows of course from the analysis of 
mediation as being negotiation facilitated b y a third party. 
A further distinction between the mediator and the 
judge is that the mediator must look forward to the consequences 
which will flow from each of the range of possible outcomes, 
since he is concerned with harmonising the interests of the 
parties. He must himself be an adpatable ne gotiator. 
One function of the mediator is to ensure that messages 
between the conflicting parties are not distorted. This aspect, 
while essential to mediation, is really the raison d'etre of 
the conciliator and will be elaborat~d upon in the later discussion 
on the conciliator. 
34. Felstiner (Note 8), 71 
- 16 -
• 
.. 
.. 
The prime function of the mediator is, on the basis of his 
understanding of the parties and the conflict, to construct outcomes 
potentially acceptable to both sides. Due to his impartiality 
the mediator may elicit agreement to an outcome which if 
suggested by one of the parties in negotiation simpliciter might 
never be agreed to through reasons of stubbornness and the like. 
Schellinc/5ctraws attention to the importance of a 
readily identifiable focal point in bargaining. There is often 
an "obvious" place to compromise, such as a river in a conflict 
between two armies, or the outcome of a previous bargain, beyond 
which one party may be expected not to retreat. Frequently there 
will be no obvious focus about which an agreement can 
crystallise and it is in this situation that the role of the 
mediator becomes apparent. "When there is no apparent focal 
point for agreement, he can create one by his power to make a 
d 
. . 11 36 . ramatic suggestion. It should be noted that by promoting 
intermediate solutions the mediator will enhance his own prestige 
and impartiality, and of course reppect from the parties in 
dispute is a pre-requisite for successful mediation. 
In mediation, certain additional devices may be used to 
facilitate agreement between the parties. For example, the 
mediator may be in the position to make promises which act as 
incentives for one party or the othe r to mo ve towards a mutually 
satisfactory outcome. On the other hand the me diator may be in 
a position to make threats if one or both of the parties remain 
rigid in their attitudes. These powers will o f ten be a vailable 
to a state appointed mediator or where the conflicting parties 
are sub-groups of the same group. 
Bearing in mind Aubert's correspondence between 
negotiation and conflicts of interest one will expect the 
effectiveness of mediation in the settlement of a dispute 
to be a function of the degree to which the conflict involves 
interest rather than values. This sugge sts that one of the tasks 
of the mediator will be to try and conce ntrate a tte ntion on the 
competing interests of the parties and play down any dissensus. 
35. 
36. 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1963), 67-74 
Idem, 144 
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"But it may also go the other way. The mediator lets himself be 
influenced by the parties to see the normative aspects as the most 
important, and ends up judging instead of mediating.
1137 
It is obvious that if mediation is to be successful 
in managing a dispute the parties must have confidence in the 
mediator and be willing to co-operate with him and respect his 
advice. There is more to this than impartiality and negotiation 
skill. Success will usually only be achieved where "mediators 
share the social and cultural experience of the disputants they 
serve, and where they bring to the processing of disputes an 
intimate and detailed knowledge of the prespectives of the 
disputants 11 •
38 A mediator is unlikely to receive all the information 
he requres from the parties, and what he does receive may be 
misleading to the uninitiated. To construct an outcome tailored 
to meet a specific dispute requires (i) an understanding of the 
history of the dispute and (ii) an understanding of the 
perspective of the disputants. The implication here for this 
form of conflict management in technological society is that its 
utility will be dependant upon a high degree of specialisation 
within the ranks of mediators. 
3 7 . 
38. 
Eckhoff (Note 7) , 16 O 
Felstiner (Note 8), 74 
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The Arbitrator 
As previously mentioned arbitration may be viewed as a sub-
category of adjudication since the decision or "award" on the 
outcome is made by the third party arbitrator and not by the 
parties. It is however a condition precedent to arbitration that 
a preliminary bargain must be struck by the parties themselves -
they must (i) agree to submit their dispute to arbitration and 
(ii) agree on the choice of arbitrator, or on some stranger to 
choose him. There are other important differences between 
adjudication in the courts and arbitration. In arbitration it 
appears to be accepted that the arbitrator may perform some 
mediative function and attempt to influence the parties to reach 
some settlement themselves. This aspect of arbitration should not 
be over emphasised since arbitration although presenting an 
informal appearance is backed by the full power of the law. 
The arbitrator does not need to make known his reasons for 
making a particular award. He does not act publically and con-
sequently need not pay allegiance to a deterministic set of 
principles where justice would appear to demand a different 
decision. 
The parties are free to choose their arbitrator. While they 
will probably choose from a class of persons having known 
experience in arbitration, this class will itself be role-
differentiated, and the parties may therefore select an arbitrator 
not only skilled in arbitrating, but also knowledgeable in the 
subject matter of the dispute. Arbitration might, then, be 
expected to be a popular form of adjudication in a technological 
society. 
The Conciliator 
Many theorists do not appear to distinguish between the 
mediator and the conciliator but as has already been suggested, 
a useful distinction can be made. The mediator's job is primarily 
one of communication:-
- 19 -
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"The conciliator can transmit messages between the parties 
with greater accuracy than is possible with direct 
messages and so we can achieve a certain reconciliation of 
images that would have been impossible without him"39 
He must attempt to generate purposive interaction between the 
parties. He does this not by simply acting as a bridge between 
the two parties. He controls the communication by putting limits 
on the offers and counter-offers and blocking off some 
"transmissions":-
"He can, for example, compare two parties' offers to each 
other, declaring whether or not the offer:s are compatible 
without revealing the actual offers".40 
The presence of a conciliator marks a transition of the original 
dyad into not a triad, but two new dyads: PARTY 1~ CONCILIATOR, 
PARTY 2 ~ CONCILIATOR. 41 This is the key to the conciliators' 
control. 
The conciliator is a 42 "broker". 
"The function of pure conciliation is simply to see that 
trading opportunities are not missed in the existing field 
of conflict through ignorance and a failure of communica-
tion; the conciliator, in this sense, is a broker, bringing 
the two parties together".43 
THE LEGAL MODEL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; THE COURTS 
Conflict management is an important function of the law. 
There are two aspects involved. First, the promulgation and 
simultaneous promotion of adherence to rules serving the interests 
of the community (as perceived by those powerful enough to deter-
mine the law). Second, the management of conflicts which arise 
as a result of non-compliance with the rules. These two aspects 
of conflict management are brought out in the following passage:-
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
"If we pose the question of the relation b e tween law and 
conflict we can, therefore, conclude that the law prevents 
Boulding, op. cit. (note 5), 316 
Schelling, op. ci t. (note 35) , 14 4 
Paine, "Second Thoughts about Earth's Models", Royal 
Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper No. 32 (1974), 25 
An expression used by Barth in "Models of Social Organization", 
R.A.I. Paper No. 23 (1966), and also others in somewhat different 
fields (see note 43) 
Boulding, op. cit. (note 5), 317 
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innumerable clashes of interests and of power by circum-scribing the positions. If these positions are generally recognized, are fixed by a central authority and are enforced by a central power, the law succeeds in preventing a great many conflicts. But those conflicts that remain are commonly felt to be more intense conflicts than they would have been if there had been no legal arrangements. The law gives to clashes of interest an ideological aspect; the opponent is seen as a wrong-doer and a criminal. The violation of the law entitles one to anger and aggressive reaction".44 
The promotion of societal rules is a function of both the 
legislature and the courts. The processing of conflicts resulting 
from a breach of those rules has traditionally been the function 
of the courts. In the courts the judge is supreme, and, in 
modern societies is a specialist. In the following discussion 
emphasis will be placed on the judicial process of decision making 
since it is this aspect of law with which other institutions of 
conflict management may be compared. 
45 Elements of the Legal Model 
(1) When a conflict is processed by the court the judge makes a 
finding on the facts, selects the norm or norms appropriate 
to the facts, and applies the norm to those facts to produce 
a decision. The reduction of the conflict to a controversy 
over facts and/or norms is possibly the most important 
characteristic of the legal model. The facts are not 
ascertained by an arbitrary process but in accordance with 
a secondary set of norms which prescribe rules of evidence 
and procedure. Formulation of the facts is not, however, 
entirely independent from the selection of the substantive 
norm. Either the parties or the judge will frequently tend 
to formulate the facts in such a way as to bring the conflict 
within the ambit of a norm which will produce the desired 
result. 
(2) Familiarity with substantive norms and secondary norms of 
procedure, and the ability to apply norms to specific fact 
44. 
45. 
Roling, "The Role of Law in Conflict 
The notion of enumerating parameters 
adopted from Aubert (1969), although 
from his. 
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Resolution" ,tJ 1966), 330. 
of a "legal model" is 
this scheme differs somewhat 
situations is not common to all. It is the cherished 
preserve of lawyers. As a result when a party to a conflict 
takes his case to court, he almost inevitably must employ 
legal counsel to represent him. Thus, as well as the judge 
and the parties the presence of legal counsel is inherent 
in the legal model. In order to ascertain the facts the 
court will almost inevitably hear "stranger" witnesses who 
will contribute information which will be used to construct 
the history of the dispute. These witnesses comprise yet a 
further class of persons essential to the legal model. 
(3) A legal decision is characterised by its either/or nature 
which may be contrasted with the compromise nature of a 
mediated outcome, for example. This means that one disputant 
may suffer total loss. This is closely linked with the 
importance placed on establishing the history of the dispute 
since it is from -this that guilt or illegality will be 
established. From .this finding legal consequences will 
ensue. The relation between the conseque nces and the 
established facts is not however the causal link one would 
46 expect to find in a scientific model. The relation is 
normative rather than causal. That is, the legal rules 
establishing the link between certain behaviour and certain 
sanctions establish that it would be right to invoke a 
sanction, not that the sanction is inevitable given the 
behaviour. At a practical level the normative character 
allows for the probability that much proscribed behaviour 
will not be detected. The distinction between human laws and 
physical laws is, however, more fundamental than this. A 
physical law establishes if conditions x and y exist then 
the result z occurs. 4 7 For example, if a metal body is heated 
it will expand. The value of a physical law is to explain 
known facts and to predict unknown facts. Physical laws 
"are subject to verification, that is, they can be true or 
false; but the notion of truth or falsity is inapplicable to 
normative rules. Such rules simply state what should or 
4 6. "Even in science, it is, often not clear what a scientist means 
when he says that one event has caused, another ... he falls 
back on such phrases as "bring about", "bring forth", "create" 
..... I 
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48 "ought to" happen". This distinction has unfortunately 
been confused by claims, which still persist, that many rules 
of a normative character (some of which form part of positive 
law) are universal laws of nature. The error of such claims 
was long ago demonstrated by Hume, more recently by Kelsen, 
and justly deserves Moore's epithet, "the naturalistic fallacy". 
(4) A judicial decision is not made on the basis that it appears 
to be the most efficacious in the circumstances, but is made 
within a framework of legal rules. Whether the rule to apply 
in a particular case is abstracted from earlier judicial deci-
sions, la jurisprudence, legislation, or a code, the abstraction 
is made by an exercise of logical reasoning. The pattern may 
be to derive a general rule from a number of specific decisions 
by induction, and then by a process of deduction formulate the 
specific rule for the case at hand. In the age of reason this 
logical consistency and symmetry i~_; held in high esteem. A 
court which achieves a desirable rE!Sult by an inexact use of 
legal conceptions causes more criticism from legal scholars 
49 than one which achieves an undesirable result in a learned way. 
There is however another strand in the legal rope - the 
dispensation of justice in particular cases. The fulfilment 
of this aim may be incompatible with the logic of the legal 
rules and frequently the result demanded by logic will prevail. 
From an historical perspective the harshness of the law has 
led to the devices of legal fictions and equity. In the 
individual case, especially where equity is itself part of the 
harsh logic, the judge must endeavour to find some aspect 
peculiar to his case which he can seize upon as a reason for 
not applying the general rule. 
46 (cont) and "produce". Those are metap horical phrases, taken from 
human activity": Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics 
47. 
48. 
49. 
(1966), 189. 
Such a "universal" law is not the only type of scie ntific law. 
There are also "statistical" laws which will in some cases 
indicate lack of knowledge but in other cases express the funda-
mental nature of the world. e.g. Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle. 
Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprude nce (1972, 3rd ed.), 8. 
Arnold, The Symbols of Government (1962), 9. 
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In this way, the judge can simultaneously affirm the general 
rule and secure justice in his case. Because the decision 
in this case will rest on some special feature the result of 
future cases has not been prejudiced since the judges in 
those cases will be free to ignore the decision because of 
its peculiar facts. Such a result, that is, an apparent 
contradiction to the general rule, would have grave implica-
tions for the rule if it were a physical l aw,as has already 
been pointed in regard to falsi f ication: con s iste nt reasoning 
and thus predictability, and the desire tor justice are 
simply two often contradictory symbols to which modern society 
50 pays homage. 
Despite the logic and apparent determinism a decision made 
using legal rules is not scientific. It is only logical 
within the given rules and not in relation to the real world. 
Some graphic examples of how the logical application of 
inherently rational principles of law can produce completely 
irrational results are given b y Thurman Arnold. 51 One of 
the simplest examples is the need (in jurisdictions retaining 
capital punishment) to save the life of a convicted murderer 
who attempts to commit suicide, using blood transfusions from 
his guards if necessary, in order that he may be executed by 
the hanging his sentence demanded. In Aubert's terms such 
examples highlight the law's concentration on behaviour and 
sanctions rather than on utility and effectiveness. 
(5) So far that pillar of common law, the jury , has not bee n 
mentioned. In orthodox theory the jury decides the facts 
while the judge decides the law. This arrangement can be 
preserved in those civil cases where the jury is still given 
a place provided the judge carefully formulates the questions 
which are put to the jury. However, in criminal cases where 
the jury must bring in a verdict, it is open to doubt whether 
50. See Arnold, op. cit. 
51. Idem, 11 to 17 
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the judge's directions on the law are definitive, and even 
whether the application of the rules of evidence during the 
trial have any greater effect than priestly incantations. 
The realist may say the place of the law here is nothing more 
than symbolism. "Yet the legal realist falls into grave 
error when he believes this to be a defect in the law 11 • 52 
"The jury symbolizes the common sense of the ordinary 
man. If we get an acceptable result out of a jury we 
feel that our entire democratic institutions, depending 
as they do upon the judgment of the.ordinary man, are 
justified. If on the other hand we get an unacceptable 
result out of them we are free to criticize this jury 
without in any way appearing to attack the judicial 
system itself. Every system which owes its prestige 
to deep-seated ideals must have an irresponsible body 
somewhere on whom the blame may be put when the ideals 
go wrong. Otherwise the system itself would have to 
absorb it, and one of the essentials of any of our 
fundamental institutions is that they be exempt from 
criticism as institutions. Thus the jury offers us an 
opportunity to be indignant at the actual result, but 
satisfied with the fundamental principles of law under 
which the result was reached".53 
(6) Like all organized occupational groups the legal profession 
jealously clings to the field it has traditionally monopolised 
and protects that field from encroachment by outsiders. 54 
The protection may be manifest as in statutory monopoly, or 
latent as in personal and collective resistance to change. 
The latter element appears to typify the legal profession, 
although of course it is not exclusive in this regard, and 
there are and always will be a number of exceptions . In 
view of this empirically observed characteristic of the legal 
model it seems not unreasonable to expect to find in a study 
of the courts at work positive resistance to penetrations of 
expertise of a non-legal character, the expertise which 
characterises technological society. 
52. Idem, 
53. Idem, 13 
54. While frontal attacks might be repelled there remains a 
further possibility - that of simply by-passing the traditional 
legal structure. See post, p.¥.5". 
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'PART II 
A - THE LEGAL MODEL IN TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
This part will open by offering the views of a few writers, 
selected at random, on the conjunction between science and law. 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
55 Thomas, in his book, Scientists and the Legal System 
identifies four ways in which the legal system uses science: 
(1) use of the scientific method by which knowledge is categorised 
in an orderly manner, 
(2) as a component of the adjudication process providing knowledge 
related to specific technical and scientific issues, 
(3) as an impetus for change - science advances faster than the 
law, 
(4) to establish policy in many areas. 
For the purposes of the present study items 1 and 4 are not so 
relevant. However, it would seem open to doubt the extent to which 
the scientific method has influenced categorisation of legal know-
ledge in common law jurisdictions. In contrast to the systematic 
classification and emphasis on theoretical structure in t~ civil lpw 
the common law appears to be arranged in a distinctly un-scientific 
manner. As to item 3, it is suggested that change in the legal 
s y stem as a result of the ascendancy of technology is not great. 
This point will be mentioned again later. 
In describing the different way in which lawyers and 
scientists work, Thomas notes: 
"Most lawyers feel at ease in an adversary proceeding, but 
scientists generally shun t his as a method for fact finding, 
preferring cooperation with fellow investigators in working 
towards a common goal. As more scientists become involved 
in the political process, they no doubt will accept the 
adversary procedure as a workable one when the issues 
involve social decisions that cannot be resolved by the 
familiar scientific regimens".56 
This certainly seems typical of the situation in common law 
jurisdictions and is probably an apt comment on the situation in 
55. Thomas (ed.), Scientists in the Legal System (/174-) 
56. Idem, 2. 
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New Zealand. It certainly seems, and this will be mentioned 
again later, that there are a large number of decisions which 
have to be made in society which cannot be determined by 
scientific considerations alone. However, even in spheres where a 
scientific input should have a large and beneficial effect on 
certain decisions whether they be in the court or in the 
political arena, science fails to realise its true potential. 
"As scientists become more committed they become more shrill 
and more adversary - and less scientific".57 
It seems that scientists run the risk of being tainted by their 
contact with politics and government, although Loevinger is perhaps 
over cynical when he says:-
"When science becomes part of government, it is science that 
is corrupted, not the government that is ennobled".58 
Many of the barriers between science and law, both real and 
imaginary , result from the fact that these two fields of knowledge 
have evolved and developed out of phase:-
"Guring the long historical period when national legal systems 
developed, science was under-developed by comparison with its 
present status".59 
Aubert points to the common aim of "predictability" which both 
law and science seek to satisfy. When science was in its infancy, 
whatever predictability could be achieved in social relations was 
primarily due to law and other normative structures:-
"With increased scientific knowledge about the regularities 
of nature and also of economic and social life, the relative 
importance of law as a way of achieving predictability has 
been receding in modern societies".60 
This is not to say that law has become superfluous, only that it 
is insufficient on its own to provide the social predictability 
needed if conflicts are to be successfully managed. 
57. Loevinger, "Jurimetrics: Science in Law", in Thomas , op. cit.)i8 
58. Idem, 20 
59. Aubert, "Courts and Conflict Resolution", (1967) 11 Jo Conflict 
Resolution, 40 at 49. 
60. Idem, 50 
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In 1966 Marshall 61 published a book which delivered a stinging 
attack on the refusal or inability of the legal system to take 
cognisance of modern science and in particular the implications 
prese nted to the legal system by the science of psychology. 
Marshall's main concern was that what the court called facts were 
often but a mere shadow of reality. There was ample psychological 
evidence to show that much of the evidence given in court did not 
correspond very well with the actual events due to the natural 
huma n failings of the witnesses which were accentuated by the 
traditional adversary system. He contrasted the legal method of 
fact finding - the adversary technique - very.poorly with the 
scie ntific methodology of fact finding. He exaplained the situation 
thus :-
"Science demands precision but not certainty. Law aims 
at certainty but glosses over the innumerable variations of 
individual and situational diversities, which probably will 
always cause the law to be uncertain ... To assume a 
scientific approach and seek precision amidst uncertainty 
would mean accepting uncertainty; and this would upset the 
balance of lawyers and appear to threaten the stability and 
the 'majesty of the law' .... There must still be fought in 
the realm of law the struggles that philosophy and the ology 
had to go through when confronted by natural sciences".62 
The use of the courts to protect the quality of the environ-
ment is common-place today. However it has been suggested that 
the courts are not the proper forum in which these matters should 
be dealt with and should be considered suitable for emergency 
measures only. Accordingly the pressure to allow citizen and 
class suits in environmental fields is misguided. The courts do 
not have the technical competence to handle the issues thrown up 
in environmental conflicts. A comparison is drawn with anti-trust 
suits where the courts have floundered even although only one non-
lega l discipline - economics - is required:-
"Environmental problems frequently involve a diverse mix 
of unrelated disciplines such as chemistry, biology, physics, 
geology and medicine, in addition to economics".63 
61. Marshall, Law and Psychology in Conflict (1966) 
62. Idem, 104. 
63 . Crampton and Boyer " c.+,1-ev- S\ -1._i'f-.s ~"'" 'h,e S"" ;,-t,'\Mt-ihd hllJ ! Pe,.,,;/ 't., ?.-v ,i..,~e ? "1 
(1972) 2 Ecology Law Quarterly, 407 at 413. 
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THE LEGAL MODEL AT WORK 
In this section a relatively recent New Zealand case will be 
analysed to demonstrate some of the distinctions between legal 
and scientific thinking and the transformation of a real conflict to 
a normative dissensus. 
Bognuda v. Upton & Shearer Ltd [1971_7 N.Z.L.R. 618 
The Plaintiff in this case owned a garage, one wall of which 
ran along the north boundary of his property. The wall was 
constructed of brick and built in 1929. In 1969, the owner of the 
adjoining property employed the defendant to c~nstruct a building 
on that property for him. The defendant in carrying out the 
foundation work excavated a trench between 4 and 5 feet deep and 
68 feet long immediately adjacent the plaintiff's boundary. The 
following night the plaintiff's wall collapsed and fell into the 
trench. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was liable for 
the damage caused to his wall and garage. Expert evidence was given 
on the cause of the collapse of the garage wall. The following 
are excerpts from the evidence given by the first expert witness, a 
consulting civil engineer:-
"Looking at the cause of the collapse, why did this wall come 
down in your opinion? It seems quite obvious to me that the 
sub-soil was poor and in fact should be described as muck. 
Without adequate precautions being taken it seems_ta me most 
obvious that any sort of similar structure would fall down if 
a deep trench had been dug beside it for the full length of 
it. How in the .trade does one avoid this? You could under-
pin if suitable. You could trench pile rather than sheet 
pile ... Or you could dig it in small sec~ions if this was 
practical in the construction of the adjacent building 
but you might have to use a combination of the whole three. 
In the building trade when excavating close to another 
construction are such precautions taken? Very common". 
The following are excerpts taken from the evidence given by a second 
expert witness, a consulting civil engineer specializing in soil 
mechanics and foundation engineering:-
''From~the results of those tests and the details about the 
-trench and the wall, what did your calculations show? My 
calculations showe d that under the applied load of the wall 
the soil supporting the foundation would fail resulting in 
a downward movement of the wall foundation ... At what depth 
of excavation would this failure occur? The failure would 
be imminent as soon as any excavation alongside the wall 
extended below the level of the underside of the wall footing. 
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It would definitely have occured as soon as the e xcavation 
was more than 12 inches below the underside of the footing". 
I n his judgment Quillam J. in reviewing the evidence stated as 
follows:-
"It was admitted that the evidence established that the soil 
underlying the brick wall was of a poor type. The evidence 
of Mr Gillespie, an expert in foundation engineering and 
soil mechanics, was that the load applied to the soil by the 
weight of the wall caused the subside nce and collapse of the 
wall. I think it is clear that but for the ,pressure of the 
wall there was no reason for the plaintiffs land to subside. 
This means that it was not the excavation of the trench which 
caused the plaintiff's land to collapse, but the pressure of 
the wall on the soil". 
The judge then turned to the law and noted that it was long 
established at common law that while an owner of land had a 
natural right to the lateral support of that land by neighbouring 
l and, he had no right of lateral support for any building on that 
land from the neighbouring land: Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App. Cas.740. 
Since it was the weight of the building which caused the land to sub-
s ide the plaintiff had no cause of action based on the right of 
l ateral support. Furthermore, since the plaintiff had no right 
nei ther the defendant or his agent were under any co-relative duty 
of care when developing .the adjoining land. Thus the second cause 
of action, negligence, also failed. This judgment caused consider-
able consternation both within and without the engineering profession. 
In the Evening Post of 25 March 1971, it was reported that a 
memorandum had been circulated to me rnben, of the Wellington City 
Council from Councillor W.G. Morrison, Chairman of the Town Planning 
Committee, urging that if the judgme nt i n Bognuda wa s the law then a 
s ta tute should be passed which would giv e build ing owners ade quate 
pro tection against their neighbours. Councillor Morrison asked how 
i n the light of Bognuda could a building owner protect his building -
although he could carry his foundations deep the question of "how 
deep" would remain. If he laid his f oundations to 40 feet, what if 
his neighbour was to construct an underground p arking building 
r equiring an excavation of 50 fe e t? Even if he set his building 
back from the boundary, similar questions would arise. 
In an April issue of the Eve ning Post, a n ed itorial supported 
the stand taken by Councillor Morrison and noted that his viewpoint 
r eceived support from the New Zealand Institution of Engineers and 
t he New Zealand Institute of Architects. The editorial reported 
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that the Wellington City Council had before it a recommendation 
that the Council seek from Government changes or clarifications in 
the law to provide property owners with protection for their build-
ings against damage caused by excavations on adjacent sites. 
The New Zealand Geornechanical Society at its meeting on 
31 March 1971 passed a motion reading:-
"that an appropriately worded letter be sent to the N.Z.I.E. expressing extreme concern at the implications consequent on the decision on this ... case and urging that this be pursued at the highest level".65 
It is now history that the Court of Appeai6 6reversed the 
decision of the Supreme Court and notwithstanding the House of Lords 
authority to the contrary, held that a cause of action could lie 
in negligence - a clear case of "priestly" manipulation of the norms 
to achieve a result compatible with common sense, scientific prin-
ciple and commercial reality. 67 
In the context of the present study the Supreme Court decision 
can be analysed in the following terms. The norm which was relevant 
to the facts of the case was a legal rule of high authority stating 
that an owner of land with buildings upon it had no right of support 
for his buildings from an owner of adjo Tping land, although he did 
have such a right in respect of the land itself. It was in the con-
text of this rule that the trial judge analysed the evidence. The 
evidence could show one of two things. First, that the land 
collapsed following the boundary excavation because the sub-soil was 
unable to sustain the stresses created by the weight of the wall, 
and second, that because of the nature 0~ the sub-soil the land 
would have collapsed even in the absence of thE wall. Only if the 
latter was shown could the trial judge say that the second part of 
the norm applied and that then the defendqnt o:r his agent owed the 
plaintiff a duty, the breach of which might found an action for 
negligence. The evidence in fact showed, bearing in mind the nature 
., 
.. 
.. ,, 
65. New Zealand Geomechanics News No. 2 (June 1971), 5. ,,,,, 66. Bognuda v. Upton & Shearer Ltd }1972] N.Z.L.R. 741. 
67. The Court of Appeal used almost the full range of devices avail-able to achieve the desired result: distinguishing; latin maxims; House of Lords decisions not technically binding; no need to look to see whether cause of action covered by old authority but whether it fell within recognized principles: Dorsett Yacht Co. Ltd v. Horne Office [197Q7 A.C. 1004. (Lord Diplock's judgment in this latter case is surely unsurpassed in its attainment of the 
symbol of Reason in the common law model of judicial decision 
making~ 
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of the sub-soil and the weight of the wall, that the sub-soil 
immediately under the wall could not sustain the stresses imposed 
in the absence of lateral support. To the judge, this meant that 
collapse of the soil and the wall following the removal of lateral 
support was caused by the weight of the wall. To the expert wit-
ne sses, and no doubt to the man in the street, the cause of the 
collapse was the removal of the lateral support. The apparent 
function of the expert evidence was that it established that the 
defendant caused the damage suffered by the plaintiff, whereas the 
r ea l function of this evidence was that it r emoved the case from 
t he ambit of the norm which the plaintiff sougnt to invoke. 
THE REALITY OF TRANSFORMATION 
The requirement that a conflict must be transformed to a 
normative and/or factual dissensus before the conflict can be 
effectively dealt with by a court has been clearly demonstrated in 
t he Bognuda analysis. The realisation that this transformation 
process exists is probably more difficult f or a l a wyer to gras p 
t han a layman. In fact it is no doubt painfull y obvious to a layman, 
who probably sees the process as equivalent to a translation from 
a f amiliar language to one that he does not unde rstand. The pro-
ces s of transforming a client's narrative of a conflict into a form 
whereby legal answers can sensibly be given, does not come naturally, 
and must be learnt through repeated practice. Before one can be 
a l awyer one must learn how to think like a lawyer. 
The transformation process essentially involves the following 
s teps. 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
"Irrelevant" material must be rejected. I rrelevant mate rial 
includes the parties' emotions, motives, desires, their non-
legal reasons for their acts, and other colour which charac-
terises reality. 
The restatement of the facts which remain after rejection into 
their generalised legal form. In this form they are at the 
level of abstraction on which legal rules are formulated. 
That is, "vendor" is substitute d for "Joseph Brown", etc. 
The framing of the legal issues. In a simple problem the 
restated facts themselves may form the l egal issue but where 
there is more than one issue, some disentanglement and 
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reassembly of the restated facts is required. It is only when 
the legal issues have been framed that the store of legal 
norms can be drawn upon to provide the legal answers or 
decisions. These norms exist at at least three levels of 
abstraction, the lowest being specific rules of law, which 
may provide a direct answer to the legal issue or issues. 
However, if there is no relevant rule of law a search must be 
made at a higher level of abstraction among the general legal 
principles. In the few cases where there is no appropriate 
general legal principle, or where there are two apparently 
conflicting principles, an appropriate norm must be sought 
amongst the fundamental social policies underlying the law. 
These latter norms are not purely legal norms, but are hybrids 
including aspects of politics, sociology, economics and ethics.68 
A transformation process as outlined above becomes second nature 
to most practising lawyers, although even persons of considerable 
experience will from time to time notice the transformation 
process, although they might not bother to think about its signifi-
cance. An example is the formulation of pleadings. 
In theory the transformation process which the modern lawyer 
is required to implement is not as drastic as it once was. Prior to 
1873, 69 a person could obtain from the court a remedy against another 
only by fitting his fact situation into specific legal categories 
or II fonns of a ction 11 • That form of action constituted the cause of 
action. Observations relevant to this point were made by Diplock L.J. 
in Letang v. Cooper jl964J2 All E.R. 929 at 934. 
11 A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence 
of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy 
against another person ... If A, by failing to exercise reason-
able care, inflicts direct personal injury on B, those facts 
constitute a cause of action on the part of B against A for 
damages in respect of such personal injuries. The remedy for 
this cause of action could, before 1873, have been obtained by 
alternative forms of action, namely, originally either trespass 
vi et armis or trespass on the case, later either trespass to 
the person or negligence ... But it is essential to realise 
that when, since 1873, the name of a fonn of action is used to 
identify a cause of action, it is used as a convenient and 
succinct description of a particular category of factual 
68 .SeeWilkin, 11 Analysis of Legal Problems in Law Examinations 11 
(Source unknown). 
69. In EnglandJSupreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873. 
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situation which enables one person to obtain from the court a 
remedy against another person. To forget this will indeed 
encourage the old forms of action to rule us from their 
graves". 
' 
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PROVIDING THE COURT WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
(a ) The Common Law Way 
In the common law non-legal expertise is normally 
injected into the proceedings as evidence, and the court receives 
exper t evidence in the same way as it receives any other evidence 
from witnesses called by the parties to give evidence on their 
behalf. The expert witness is treated in the same way as other 
witne sses and is examined and cross-examined like any other 
membe r of his side in the symbolic battle. "And so, when in a 
tr ial in the courts a medical man is summoned to give evidence, 
he steps into something which is not designed for the pursuit 
of abstract justice, but into a contest which is being fought 
according to certain 
the man, on the skill 
rules, where success depends so often on 
with which the battle is fought. In this 
contest counsel's duty is to fight his client's case with all the 
vigour at his command. He must not let his personal sympathy 
with other professional men blunt his attack . He can be no 
70 respecto r of persons". 
As has been noted in an earlier section, the scientist 
in this sort of atmosphere is like a fish out of water . In the 
case of expert witnesses the traditional procedure , which is 
designed to ensure the credibility and veracity of evidence 
given by witnesses, is in many repsects unnecessary and unsuitable. 
"Cross-examination moreover, frequently converts an expert who 
is trying to be impartial into one who is partisan when he finds 
himself attacked and his authority challenged. 11 71 Given this 
atmosphere it is probably not surprising that experts and the 
courts have not combined well . "hardly any weight is to be given 
to the evidence of what are called scientific witnesses ; they come 
with a bias on their minds to support the cause in which they are 
ernbarked ".
72 
New Zealand courts have much the same opinion: 
70. 
71. 
72 . 
McCarthy J., "The Expert Witness ", !'.tl966 7 N.Z.L.J. 8 at9 
Hammelmann, "Expert Evidence ", (1947) 10 M.L.R. 32 at 34, 
per Lord Campbell in Tracy Peerage (1843) 10 , Cl . 
and Fin. 154 at 191. 
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11 this class of eviden·ce has, I regret to say, become suspect 
in the eyes of some of the judicial office-holders - not all, 
by any means, but some. 1173 
The worth of expert evidence has even been doubted 
by experts. At a time when the courts and their procedure would 
have been accepted without question as blameless the following comment 
was made in a medical journal in 1863. "Medical evidence delivered 
in our courts of law has of late become a public scandal and a 
professinal dishonour. The bar delights to sneer and ricicule it; 
the judge on the bench solemnly rebukes it; and the public stand 
by in amazement; and honourably minded members of our profession 
are ashamed of it 11 • 74 Nowadays the experts' criticism is no 
longer directed against themselves, it is against the courts lack 
of appreciation of scientific fundamentals, and against the adversary 
system. 
"Science and the law shared a landable aim in their ,, 
unstinting search for truth and it must therefore be a 
matter of considerable concern to New Zealanders to 
discover that decisions taken in law could so often 
be based on complex scientific evidence that brought the 
specialists themselves into conflict as to its meaning ... 
It is surely a weakness of our system if specialists' 
evidence purportedly introduced to clarify in facts ends 
75 in obscuring truth". 
Experts fees they have to suffer unjustifiable personal 
attacks which add insult to the injury already suffered sinply 
as a result of having to deal with the twentieth century in a 
nineteen century setting. They are most concerned at being thrown 
against their colleagues in contest situations where the reputation 
73. McCarthy J., ibid (Note 70), 11. 
74. The British Medical Journal, 2 May 1863, quoted in 
Myers, "The Battle of the Experts", 44 Nebraska Law Review, 539 
75. Statement by the president of the New Zealand Institute 
of Chemists following the Thomas case retrial and reported in 
The Evening Post, 23 April 1975. 
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of their professions is bound to suffer in the minds of people 
h d t . t th 1 . . f · 7 6 w o o no apprecia e e comp exities o science. 
In view of the doubts expressed by both the courts and 
the experts on the value of expert evidence obtained in an 
adversery setting it might have been expected that reforms would 
have been instituted many years ago. Unfortunately the reforms 
have been too timid, not utilised, ot have not got beyond the 
d f 
77 . . . . rat stage. In some instances it is possible for the court to 
78 appoint an expert assessor, but even in these situations 
1 . d 79 assessors are rare y appointe , and are not apparently 
regarded as officers of the court, but instruments of proof 
which the court may disregard if it feels so inclined.
8° Fairly 
far reaching proposals were made in the Banks Report where it Mas 
recommended that judges in patent cases should have qualifications 
. . 81 . . 1n science. However, the use of assessors or specialist 
judges will not overcome many of the problems referred to since 
these will persist so long as the parties are free to call their 
own experts. 
76. Poimts made at a meeting of the New Zealand Insitituion 
of Engineers and the New Zealand Geomechanical Society on "Legal 
Problems arising from Geotechnical Works'', 17 April 1975, and by 
~-<.on Locker and Guy Salmon on the Concert Programme in "Topic", 
10 May 1977. 
77. For an account of the repeated failures to institute 
changes in the United States see Travis, "Impartial Testimony under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence: A French Perspective", 8 The 
International Lawyer, 492 
7 8. 
79. 
For example in patent cases: The Patent Rules, rule 5. 
In patent cases which are notoriously the most 
technical, the court in Valensi v. British Radio Corporation 
i-1973_/ R.P.C. 337, appointed a scientific advisor for the first 
time since 1935. This case dealt with a µc:1L c nt for .:i. colotn· 
television system. 
80. per Lord Summer in Australis v. Nautilus i-1927 7 
A.C. 153. In this case the penalty for the courts failure to 
understand scientific evidence was made evi<ient - The loss lay with 
the party on whom the burden of proof rested for the issue in 
question. 
81. The British System, Report of the Committee to Examine 
the Patent System and Patent Law ( 19 7 0, cmnd. 4 4 0 7) . 
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It is tentatively suggested that the legal system has 
not expedieted the changes needed if the courts are to receive 
assistance from experts in a rational way, and thereby come to 
grips with the technological world not to mention a more accurate 
ascertainment of truth, for two reasons. First, because of the 
natural inertia of the legal system which seems anchored to 
bygone eras where the position of the courts was unchallenged, and 
second, because of the reluctance of the courts to share their 
role with persons having expertise outside the field of law. A 
patent, and some would say shocking, demonstration of this latter 
1 . . 
82 h f e ement was given in Epperson v. Dampney. , byte Court o 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The case concerned 
the conpeting claims of mother and father for the custody of their 
two children. A psychiatrist and a psychologist had given 
evidence for the respective sides and there had been substantial 
agreement between them on what action would be the most beneficial 
as far as the interests of the children were concerned. All 
other factors being equal the judge at first instance decided on 
the basis of the expert evidence to grant custody to the father 
in preference to following the "mother principle". Two appeal 
judges (the majority) were scandalised. Per Glass J.A.: 
82. (1976) 10 A.L.R. 227 - There are numerous examples 
both judicial and extra-judicial. In an extra-judicial comment 
Lord Justice Harman is reported as saying in 1966 that "when he 
was young psychiatrists had not b3en invented, and no one was 
any worse for it.'' (Quoted in Abel-Smith and Steven, 
of Justice (1968), 184.) 
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"But I am satisfied that the trial judge in giving 
the expert evidence such a decisive operation 
misapprehended its tenor and accorded to it 
disproportionate weight ... No witness, however expert, 
may be asked in whose custody the welfare of the child 
will best be served. Since the answer to that question 
depends on the application of a legal standard, it 
can be given only by the judge ... I am directed by 
authority to apply the common knowledge possessed 
by all citizens of the ordinary human nature of mothers''~] 
Per Street C.J.: 
8 3 • 
84. 
"The topic is to evaluated against the background that 
our system of jurispredence does not, generally 
speaking, remit the determination of disputes to 
experts ... Our Society has selected a curial tribunal 
as that which in the greatest number of cases will 
come nearer to the best answer ... But the antiseptic 
philisophy of Huxley's Brave New World has not yet 
rendered obsolete a human evaluation of the complex 
web of parental and filial emotions that entangle all 
the persons concerned in disputed custody cases. It 
is ultimately the conventional and human wisdom of the 
judge, experienced as he is in matters of this sort, 
that must be applied in resolution of the contest. 1184 
Idem, 240, 241 
Idem 228. 
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The Civil Law Way 
The courts of France , for example, receive expert 
assistance not from a witness for one of the parties, but from 
an expert appointed by the court. The expert makes an 
investigation and presents a report of his finding to the court in 
a proceeding known as an expertise . In the expertise the experts' 
role is that of an investigator - he may conduct experiments , 
make on- the-spot enquiries , and even examine witnesses who do not 
testify under oath as they would before a judge, but whose 
statements neverhteless are accpeted as inferences under the 
relaxed rules of evidence typical of the civil law . The expert 
presents his report in written form at the final hearing in the 
case , the audience , where counsel for the parties may question 
it as being in conflict with recognised authority or 
inconsistent, for example. Notwithstanding any criticism the 
report will usually be accepted by the court, if only as inference 
As with all evidence the court will usually admit everything 
and give to individual items of evidence whatever weight they 
see fit . There is no question of a party being penalised if the 
court cannot understand the experts ' report - it will be ordered 
to be clarified , or a new expertise set down. In general, 
however, the court and the parties will usually accept the 
experts ' findings . 
The response of the civil law to the increasing 
need for the court to receive expert assistance was to establish 
a position for the appropriate expert or exp:·~ts in the tribunal 
. 86 itself . 
85. Full information on the expertise, a proceeding 
designed for civil suits (the criminal proceedings broadly 
follows the same pattern) may be found in Herzog, Civil Procedure 
in France , Chapter 7. A description is also given in Travis 
(Note 77) , and additional comments and criticism may be fo-nd in 
Schlesinger , Comparitive Law . 
86 . It seems accepted in France that the expert is part 
of the tribunal and not simply an instrument of proof who is 
not a witness: Hammelann (Note 71). 
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To adopt this · course was, it is only fair to point 
out, much easier for the civil law than it would have been for 
the common law since the statements of witnesses were always 
presented to the full court in documentary form following 
investigations made by one of the judges in an enque tte. The 
expertise is no doubt a more "scientific" approach to that 
taken by the common law, and certainly in France experts 
are highly regarded, but "some French practitioners are ... 
of the opinion that the French Courts are inclined to accept the 
expert evidence too lightly at its face value, and assert the 
courts have fallen into the 'bad habit' of throwing their 
responsibility too often, and unnecessarily, upon experts". 87188 
87. Idem, 38. 
88. The relation with the Arnold/Frankenberg analysis 
(p.4+) is interesting. 
- 41 -
"to·' 
s. 
0 
0 z 
• 
• .. 
.. 
A SOCIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE EXPERT'S ROLE 
89 
Frankenberg in a study of how responsibility is attributed and 
what social action follows has analysed the role played by 
scientific advisors to the Chiefs of Staff, a British wartime 
Cabinet sub-sommittee. The study is effectively a re-interpretation 
of the conflict within the Chiefs of Staff sub-committee as 
chronicled by C.P. Snow 
weight to the influence 
90 , who Frankenberg believes gave undue 
of personalities. 
The conflict was one that occured in 1942 between the 
Chiefs of Air Staff, who advocated the strategic bombing of the 
German civilian population in order to destroy morale, and the 
Chiefs of Naval Staff, who advocated the use of bombers in a tactical 
commitment to the actual zones of military conflict. The scientists 
in the controversy were Professor Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, a 
friend of Churchill's who supported the airforce policy, and Sir 
Henry Tizard who supported the navy policy. Lord Cherwell presented 
calculations demonstrating the catastrophic damage which would 
result from bombing built-up areas with the sort of air force which 
should be available. Tizard produced calculations which indicated 
fallacies in Lord Cherwell's. Both sets of calculations were 
however based on factors "which could not be measured and scarcely 
guessed." The crux of Frankenberg's analysis is where the committee 
conflict comes out into the open, 
•sir Dudley Pound, representing the Admiralty, and 
Lord Portal, representing the Air Ministry, used 'stranger' 
scientists and mathematical myths to express viewpoints and 
legitimate decisions which in fact are largely affected by the 
relative political power of Air Ministry and Admiralty and by 
external events ... the scientits are being manipulated by 
91 events and institutions more than they are influencing them 
Frankenberg, "Taking the Blame and Passing the Buck", in 
., ' 
89. 
90. 
91. 
Gluckman (ed), The Allocation of Responsibility (1972), 257 r ' 
Snow, Science and Government (1961) 
Idem, 266 
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A pure scientific decision was not possible in view of the 
grossly approximate nature of the calculations which were 
really only intended to make the cases presented more graphic. 
" .... it was impossible to calculate the size and 
duration of attack which would be necessary to reduce 
Germany to the point of capitulation. It was only 
possible to guess .... The difference of opinion between 
Lord Cherwell and Sir Henry Tizard was, therefore, really 
no more than an illustrative reflection, in somewhat more 
scientific terms, of the issues which divided the counsels 
of the Air and Naval Staffs. 1192 
It is interesting to note that at one stage a different 
category of "stranger" was called in. This "stranger" was a judge, 
Singleton J, who managed not only to support both sides at different 
times but "went one better and supported both sides at once". This 
served to exacerbate the dispute and it was easy to draw quotations 
93 to illustrate almost any argument. However as the official 
historians noted 
" .... the Singleton Report did perform one valuable service. It 
showed that a decision about bombing policy could not be 
arrived at on the basis of academic investigations into the 
prospects of the strategic bombing offensive. Whether these 
investigations were statistical or juridical they could, 
because of the nature of the evidence, prove nothing. 1194 
Two hypotheses arise from Frankenberg's analysis which have 
particular relevance to the aspects of conflict management of special 
interest in the present paper. They are, (1) that experts may be 
used by a decision making tribunal merely as a less obvious 
component in the ceremony and ritual which traditionally accompanies 
such decision making, (2) that because of the inadequacy of the facts 
many decisions are not decisions which can be made any better by 
scientiiic experts. One does not need to look far, either in or 
outside the courtroom to test these hypotheses. 
92. Idem, 268 
93. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against 
Germany (1961), 338 quoted in Frankenberg, idem, 270 
94. Ibid. 
CAW USRAR'i' 
A UNIVERSITY OF. WELLINGTON 
- 43 -
,., , 
s. 
0 
0 z 
• 
• .. 
-
The New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception, 
Sterilisation and Abortion is surely an excellent illustration 
of their truth. 
Of the other examples given by Frankenberg to demonstrate 
his thesis, that attribution of responsibility to a "stranger" 
has the effect of shifting outside the system the consequence 1n 
social action in the attribution of responsibility within the 
system, two are of special interest in the present context. The 
first is the role of the psychiatrist in the legal defence of 
insanity. Despite the fact that psychiatrists are not experts 1n 
individual responsibility 
95 they can be used· by the courts as outside 
experts to enable a finding of insanity or diminished responsibility 
so that the accused may be "spared" yet the law still be upheld. The 
psychiatrist's role was of course somewhat more vital before 
capital punishment for murder was abolished. Frankenberg cites the 
Challenor affair as an illustration outside the murder context, where ,,, 
Challenor a detective sergeant, had been planting offensive weapons 
on his suspects and was subsequently found to be insane. An 
e arlier case where two men had been convicted on evidence g iven 
by Challenor was resurrected and the Court of Criminal Appeal seized 
on flimsy evidence given by one psychiatrist out of three that 
Challenor may have been insane at the rel e vant time 1n the instant 
case (two years before this time he was found insane), and quashed 
the convications. 
The second example 1s the role played b y the common law jury, 
group whch exists for only a short time "and when they have carried 
out their impossible and irrational task they disappe ar back into 
the people from which they came, impervious to criticism and too 
e vanescent for revenge". In both thes e examples the 
II strangers 11 
may also clearly be seen as means by which Thurman Arnold's 
incompatible symbols are accommodated (see pp 24 and 25, ante) 
95. cf treatment 
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B - EXT"!Th-J.ECJ\J, INSTITPTin1\J.c; OF CONFLICT Jvl.ANJ\"E!"ENT 
"At tJ.e turn of the century it seemed to many that 
the Enqlish courts and English lawyers were at the 
hear t of affairs ; but as the Welfare State expanded 
most new and vital issu~s were left either completely 
in the hands of the increasinaly powerful Civil Service, 
or if some adversary procedure were deemed necessary , 
governments mme to prefer flexible policy-conscious 
ac'!mi nistrative tribunals to the more cnJ'T1brous and 
formalistic courts o~ law .. . ~eanwhile even former 
patrons of the courts, such as the commercial and 
industrial interests, gradl.Blly turned to arbitration 
rathP.r than settle their disputes in the courts . 
The result was t~at a relatively smaller number of the 
major prohlems of modern society were coming before 
the courts of law . "96 
Administrative bo~ies set up in New ~Fala~~ are leqion, 
encompassing a wide spectrum of interest · - Rent Appeal Boards, 
Race Relations Cenci la tor, Human Rights 1:on,mi ssion, ToKn 
and Country Planninq Appeal Boards, the •J f f 1.ce of Ombudsman, 
Reqional Water Boards and the Clean Air :ouncil - to name a few 
of those establishe2 in more recent times. Many require expertise 
of a non-leqal character . The number of cases heard by ad-
Ministrati ve tribunals in comparison \vi th the number of mses 
heard by the courts is not known for New Zealand, but it 
presurnatly does not differ greatly from the situation in Britain 
where such borlies 1-iear mo:re cases than all the courts combined . 97 
Many administrative tribunals are essentially adjudicative 
institutions like the cnnrts, and it is possibly more interesting 
to examinP more patently extra-legal institutions of conflict 
management such as arbitration, and mediation, albeit that these 
institutions may well be partially or whollv integrated into the 
administrative system. 
l1'1S'T'I'J'l1'1'IONALISTm IV'EDI J\'1'I01\J Al\JD C'0NC'1I,ATIOl\J 
It is very much the trend for administrative bodies 
96, Abel-Smith and Stevens, "Lawyers a.'.1d the Courts" , in 
Aubert (ed . ) Sociology of Law (1960) , 279 at 280 , 281 
Idem , 285 . -45-
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set up to deal with disputes to be given conciliative rather 
than adjudicative powers. l'ill example of this approach is 
found in the Human Rights Commission Bill 1977, where among 
other functions the Commission is given the function, in relation 
to complaints about industrial union~ and professional and 
trade associations, " 
"to investigate any complaint made to it ... and to act 
as conciliator in relation to such complaint."98 If 
"the Commission is of the opinion that the complaint 
has substance, it shall use its best endeavours to 
secure a settlement between the parties concerned."99 
Why has conciliation as a means for managing disputes 
been seen as "the answer"? Is it because it has been recognised 
that the sort of disputes envisaged will all be Aubert's 
interest conflicts? This is hardly likely bearing in mind the 
sub ject matter - is a racial conflict in the New Zea land 
context really going to be a conflict of interest ? It is 
suggested that the real reason for this trend is a recognition 
of the shortcomings of the adversary s ys tem as a means c£ 
re so~_ving disputes. The adversary proc,~ 1ure implicit in 
adjudicative proceedings in New Zealand se rves to exaggerate 
conflict and is inclined to leave permanent scars on those 
who participate. The conciliative approach has found such 
favour with legislators that it may even be found in the 
Small Claims Tribunals (No .2) Bill 1976 - "The primary 
function of a ~ribunal is to attempt to oring the parties 
to a dispute to an agreed settlement."100 
An early example in the trend to conciliation may be 
fo und in the Domestic Proceedings Act 1968. Section 13 
creates a duty on solicitors to give consideration to the 
possibility of a reconciliation of the parties. More importantly 
persons having expertise in marital conciliation or marriage guidance 
98 . clause 60 ( J) (a) 
99 . clause 61 (1) 
loo. clause 15(1) 
-46-
t• 
.,, 
,. ' 
,,., 
• 
s. 
0 
0 z 
• .. 
counselling are given stat~tory recognition, The courts 
must refer the case to such persons upon receiving an 
application for a separation order and adjourn legal 
proceedings.101 Upon receiving applications for maintenance 
or custody orders the court may similarly refer such cases 
to a conciliator.102 There is even provision for an~ parte 
request to the court to have a failing marriage referred to 
a conciliator,103 Thus purely legal machinery has been 
considered as inadequate in the area of marriage breaMdown. 
But is a marital conflict a conflict of interest to \,·hich, 
from Part I, conciliation is an appropriate maqaging device? In 
Aubert's terms it probably is not, but in Boulding's terms 
conciliation ~ay possibly law to an alteration of self-image 
and a reconciliation of images. Certainly the accepted settlement 
upon a couple parting is a separation agreement, a contract 
which establishes the respective rights of the parties in terms 
of an allocation of interests. Maybe conciliators in this 
field would be more effective in negotiating an amicable 
agreement to separate, than "reconciling" the parties. 
ARBITRATION 
"There has been an almost continuous dissatisfaction 
with the courts as a means of settling disputes 
registered by businessmen over a period of more 
than a century. The costs, delays, formalities 
and publicity of court proceedings, and also the 
personal antagonisms engendered by the English 
approach to litigation, have led a large segment of 
the industrial and co~mercial community to abandon 
the courts and establish their own tribunals for set-
tling disputes,"104 
Many contracts in the commercial field contain "arbitration 
clauses" which bind the parties to refer any dispute arising 
from the contract, to an arbitrator named in the contract, 
to be determinrl by agreement, or to be named by some third 
party. Contracts customarily including arbitration clauses 
extend from property leases and patent licences to construction 
101. 
102. 
10 3, 
104. 
Domestic Froceedings Act 1968, s.15(1) 
Ibid, s. 15 ( 2) 
Ibid, s .14 
Abel-Smith and Stevens, idem, (note 96), 282 
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contracts. Arbitration is facilitated by the Arbitration Act 
1908 which prescribes procedure, and contains as a schedule 
an international protocol under which the signatory countries 
recognise arbitration awards issued in other countries. As well 
as the factors of speed, informality, expense, and interantional 
certainty arbitration possesses two other advantages attractive 
to the commercial and technical community, 
"In the first place, an arbitration is a private 
meeting; the only record is the arbitrator's award handed 
to the parties. In the second place, the·arbitrator 
will almost invariably have first-hand knowledge of the 
practicalities of the problems involved, and because 
of the flexibility and informality that is possible in 
arbitration proceedings the parties get the benefit 
of this knowledge and are not necessarily faced with the 
"yes or no, black or white" type of decision that 
Courts tend to make".105 
The possibility of having an adjudicator who has an understanding 
of the subject involved is very attractive to parties involved 
in contracts of technology and is possibly the most important 
reason why arbitration is popular in these spheres.106 
There are some aspects of arbitration which ~ay be 
disadvantageous in so~e circumstances. 
"Unless ... 1Short cut' procedures are specified in the 
submission, the arbitrator ~ bound to proceed by 
the adversary system, and to make his award on the 
evidence presented to him. IIe may apply his own 
expertise and observation, but he may not him!:e1.f call 
evidence unless both parties agree"l07 
105. Brickell, Arbitration of Civil and Engineering Contracts", 
29 New Zealand Engineering, 352 at 353 (15 December 1974). 
106. See Brickell, Ibid, and also Turner, Contracts and 
Contract Administration (1967) 
10 7. Bricke 11, Idem, 35 4. 
-48-
,.,, 
r'· , 
• 
s. 
0 
0 z 
• 
.. 
Also commercial and professional organisations often 
insist on arbitration clauses in contracts with lay clients with 
the result that a client finds himself governed by trade customs 
or professional practices which he had no hand in creating.108 
In this sense the basic foundation of arbitration, the agreement 
to arbitrate may only exist in the letter but not the spirit. 
Many commercial disputes do not even go as far as arbitration. 
They may be solved by direct negotiation 108a or under the 
guidance of an ad hoe mediator or conciliator who may in fact be 
the arbitrator. Whatever mode is chosen the co~rts seem the 
least popular. 
THE THERAPEUTIC STATE 
There are many who belive that technological society 
has ~et the challenge of convincing deviants of the error of 
their ways in a way for more effective than the application 
simple coercive power (see P.16, ante). The basic notion is 
that authority, including the law, has embraced the concept tlwt 
deviants are sick and therefore need to be treated by the 
state rather than punished by the state.109 
10 8. 
108a. 
10 9. 
110. 
"Within this system (the 'therapeutic state'), little or 
no emphasis is placed upon an individual's guilt or a 
particular crir-,e: but much weight is given to his 
physical, mental, or social shortcomings. In dealing 
with the deviant, under the new system, society is said 
to be acting in a parental roll (parens patriae) - seeking 
not to punish but to chanqe or socialise the non-conformist 
through treatment and therapy."110 
Abel-Smith and Stevens, In Search of Justice (1968), 88. 
Macaulay, "Non-Contrc:.cti.-'al Relations in BusTness" in 
Aubert (ed.) , Sociology of Law ( 196 9) , 19 4 
This tendency is a characteristic of modern as opposed to 
primitive societies according to Glu::::kman. In primitive 
societies individual responsibility is emphasised or even 
exaggerated, whereas in modern societies individual res-
ponsibility is diminished and structural causes emphasised 
"Moral Crises: Magical and Secular Decisionsu, in 
Gluckman(ed.), The . Allocation of Responsibility (1972) 
Kittrie, The Right to be Different (1971), 3, 
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More succinctly: "Social control through legal psychiatry" 111 
While broadening the committment standards for entry into 
pychiatric hospitals has delighted psychiatrists, "the decision 
about compulsory admission is now largely in the hands of those 
experts in psychiatric illness, and in this way patients may, 
if necessary, be admitted in order to forestall inevitable 
permanent deterioration ... " 112, it has disturbed others who 
would advocate that the same procedural safeguards available to 
a person being dealt with under the criminal justice system should 
be available to persons being dealt with by the therapeutic 
state. 
If is is accepted that the therapeutic state is concerned 
with social control as well as individual welfare, this is a 
field where science ms outstripped the law, not for the benefit 
of society but rather to its detriment, conjuring up images 
of Huxley's Brave New World. 
CONCLUSION 
There has been a decline in the im9ortance of the courts 
as conflict managing agencies accompanied by a growth in extra-
legal conflict managing agencies. This trend has been noted 
by a number of writers, some of whom have been referred to in 
this paper. It is submitted that this situation is primarily 
due to the inability or unwillingness of the legal system to 
undergo change. The courts have failed to adjust to the 
needs of technological society. The reform needed to enable 
the courts to acquire the non-lega l expertise necessary to 
successfully cope with the growth in dispute subject matter beyond 
the understanding of intelligent laymen has been resisted. 
111. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity Penguin ~d.) 1974, 13. 
112. Hays, New Horizons in Psychiatry ( 2nd ed. , 19 71) , 3 3 7 
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CNen this situation it is h
ardly surprising that many 
conflicts 
have been steered wilfully,
 and by legislation, away f
rom the 
courts to mediation, arbitr
ation and other extra-lega
l 
adjudicative bodies, where 
the necessary expertise cou
ld be more 
easily found, and where, fo
r some cases, a more approp
riate 
compromise decision could b
e obtained. 
However this is not to say 
the legal system is becomin
g 
irrelevant. It has already
 been noted that some decis
ions connot, 
because of inadequate infor
mation, be made by experts 
alone. 
Furthermore the challenge t
o the courts'role in crimin
al 
law by the abuse of technol
ogy by society is to·be re
sisted. 
Where civil liberties are c
oncerned the courts are the
 most 
appropriate forum, and are 
tolerably effective, since 
in such 
conflicts there is no nece
ssity for the transformation
 process 
required when the conflict 
is one of interest. 
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